See part one of the series here.

The Link continues to revisit the Fabrikant affair, when Concordia mechanical engineering professor Valery Fabrikant shot and killed four professors on August 24, 1992, fueled by thoughts of conspiracy and inequality. Concordia University commissioned two reports to investigate the reasons behind the shootings as well as Fabrikant’s allegations that plagiarism and conflicts of interest were rampant in the research world.


As details emerged from the history behind the shootings after August 24, 1992, Concordia University began to get flack from all sides, many wondering why someone known to have an erratic temper would continue to work for the school and if, indeed, Fabrikant’s allegations of plagiarism and misuse of money were founded.

Fabrikant clearly admitted guilt in the shootings. He insisted that the trial should not be about his guilt—rather that it should be an inquiry as to why he was pushed to the brink. Some wondered if he was not a whistleblower on Concordia’s disorganized administration.

Concordia commissioned two independent reports about the Fabrikant affair that were released in 1994. The Cowan report dealt with Fabrikant’s employment history as well as the University’s actions in regards to his behaviour, and the Arthurs report looked into academic and scientific integrity among professors.

What the conclusions of the reports conceded was that Fabrikant was partly right and that the University had acted poorly and waffled on an issue that should have been dealt with years before.

Rose Sheinin, Concordia’s vice-rector academic at the time, and Rector Patrick Kenniff were sharply criticized for not taking action, although they had the powers to do so. Sheinin said that the reports were inadequate and the responsibility lay with the mechanical and engineering department.

In the aftermath, Kenniff resigned, Sheinin’s contract was not renewed and the three professors at the centre of Fabrikant’s allegations—Dean Srikanta Swamy, Tom Sankar and Sheshadri Sankar—were quietly asked to leave their positions.

Lacking centralized power

The Cowan report was largely critical of the University’s inability to put the pieces of the puzzle together. Several people had been threatened by Fabrikant over the years, but no one had ever filed a formal complaint against him. Cowan criticized the administration, writing that “there is no institutional memory … universities are vastly more decentralized than other enterprises. There is no central clearing house for important information.”

Indeed, it was only on October 30, 1992, in an emergency meeting, that “members of the administration, who in the past never had much information about Dr. Fabrikant’s bad behaviour outside the faculty, were learning more and becoming more fearful.” Fabrikant’s file contained little record of his erratic behaviour and threats.

Heads of departments were also sharply criticized for their lack of knowledge in dealing with employee/employer relations. Professors are not administrators and “when faced with the challenge of a ‘bad’ colleague, whose behaviour is disruptive, threatening or merely unethical, they do not generally know what their powers are, and are massively risk-averse when it comes to exercising those powers, even when they are aware of them.”

This was the case time and time again, as there was a struggle from either side of the administrative spectrum. From being described as a genius to irrational, no one knew if he was really dangerous or just an eccentric professor. No one could decide if he should be promoted or fired.

On September 1, 1983, Fabrikant was promoted to research associate professor. Twenty-six days later, he was described as being “irrational.” In 1989, Fabrikant received a merit award, a raise and a congratulatory memo on his new book. In 1990, he was refused promotion to research professor despite good reviews.

“The absence of a collective approach to decision-making even for the most significant matter is necessary,” writes Cowan. “Each senior officer decides in isolation about questions which arise.”

In addition, senior administrators never gave proper warning to Fabrikant until it was too late. A letter to Fabrikant was sent out one week before the shooting, warning him to cease his harassment campaign via email. No one is certain whether he ever even received it.

Cowan also indicates that the university should have investigated Fabrikant’s allegations of conflicts of interest and misuse of co-authorship to appease the professor’s anxieties and deal with the ethics and integrity of scientific research.

Pressure brings unethical ways

The Arthurs report dealt specifically with the allegations Fabrikant had against his colleagues, namely Dean Srikanta Swamy and professors Tom Sankar and Sheshadri Sankar. Fabrikant alleged they had conflicts of interests with their university contracts and their deals with private enterprises. He was also furious that he was forced into giving co-authorship to these supervisors when they did not contribute to the work.

With regret, Arthurs admits that Fabrikant was accurate on certain allegations.

Fabrikant considered himself a “scientific prostitute,” saying he was forced to put Prof. Tom Sankar’s name on several articles from 1980 to 1985. Arthurs says that although Sankar had discussed several articles and findings with Fabrikant, “Prof. Sankar could not have made a substantive scientific contribution” in all cases.

Arthurs pointed to the strong pressures of scientists being prolific in their work and “that those pressures may in turn lead to the adoption of strategies for being as prolific as possible, and that some of these strategies may promote undesirable behaviour.”

Naming colleagues, even with little contribution, was a way for many researchers to up their publication records and gain more grants and projects. It was a way for colleagues to help each other out in the cutthroat world of research. Yet, in a taped conversation with Fabrikant, Sankar asked him, “Did I ask you to put my name on any of your papers? You did it voluntarily.”

Fabrikant and his colleagues were all somewhat guilty of wrongful co-authorship, explains Arthurs. Fabrikant might have been forced to put co-authors even when they did not contribute significantly, but Fabrikant was also guilty of re-using previous articles he published in Russia as new data.

The report harshly criticized the school, stating that “Concordia appears to have no policies or standards of scientific and academic integrity.”

Sankar was also found guilty of conflict of interest with certain private contracts he obtained. University researchers should give priority to their academic obligations before undertaking any private research. The university was lax on how much was too much—private contracts were simply a way to obtain a bigger salary and recognition.

For example, Sankar obtained a contract from Transport Canada to study liquid tanker stability through his company Sheshadri Sankar Inc, even though the university had bid for the same contract. Arthurs criticizes Sankar for not being loyal to the university and that the contract was “well in excess of any limit which might be reasonable for someone who was the director of a major university research center.”

Also, the efforts of at least one research student “were used to generate a private profit for Professor S. Sankar,” writes Arthurs. Tom Sankar, S. Sankar’s brother was also put on the payroll for the project, although none of his work was included in the final report.

These were some of several discrepancies with research projects, and unethical behaviour that angered Fabrikant. Both reports scolded the administration for not inquiring earlier into Fabrikant’s allegations.

Dealing with today’s pressures

The reports were a harsh criticism of Concordia’s administration and the university’s lack of accountability and ethical behaviour in scientific research. The university listened carefully and has since changed its stance on dealing with incidences of violence or threatening conduct.

“In hindsight, there were a lot of warning signs,” says Peter Cote, director of Concordia’s Rights and Responsibility Department, of the shootings. “They were not properly and effectively acted on.”

This new department was created in 1996, mostly as a response to the events of 1992. It is a central place where people can report any strange behaviour or case of harassment. “I am the one person who has the big picture, instead of bits of information in different offices.” By doing so, Cote can see patterns emerging and decide when to act.

In the event of an emergency situation, Cote can quickly gather a team from the university, from security agents to health services employees, to heads of departments, to act rapidly to protect the students and staff of the university.

The University now errs on the side of caution when threats are made—Cote would rather deal with the possibility of the school being sued, a union taking action or the possibility of bad press in the event of a mistake than to leave a situation unattended.

Luckily, he says, his department doesn’t have to deal with such situations very often, but adds, “it’s a big world out there. It’s a normal part of any kind of institution.”